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to safeguard the rights of witnesses.51 Another possibility is found in
the method used by the Royal Commissions in England. This method
would employ such help as impartial experts and use a greater selectivity
in the calling of witnesses.5 2
JAMES H. YAGLA
Federal Income Taxation-Lease or Conditional Sale: Plaintiff, in its taxable year 1953, inaugurated a tool lease program and
by the end of 1954 had entered into agreements with respect to
eighty-seven machines that it manufactures. Under this program
the lessee had a choice of three plans, A, B or C. Plan A called for
a mandatory rental period of three years at 25% of the list price
per year, B for two years at 30% and 25% respectively, and C for
one year at 35%. If the lessee so desired, it could purchase under
plan A at the end of the third year for 45% of the list price, under plan
B at the end of the second for 60%, and under plan C at the end
of the first for 80%. There were also provisions whereby a lessee could
return the property or exercise the option to purchase at times
subsequent to the mandatory rental period. All three plans ran for
a maximum of seven years and carried a minimum option to purchase at 25% of the list price at the end of that time. In its 1954
tax return plaintiff treated the revenue derived from such agreements as rental income and deducted depreciation on the leased
machines. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service audited plaintiff's books and declared the leases to be conditional sales for federal income tax purposes. After paying the additional taxes plaintiff sued for refund. Held: The lease-option agreements were what
they purported to be, and petitioner was thereby allowed to treat
the proceeds as rental income and deduct depreciation. Kearney &
Trecker Corporation v. Commissioner, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis.
1961).
The lease-option agreement has both tax and non-tax advantages.' The principal non-tax benefits are a freeing of the working
capital of the lessee and an added selling feature in the sales pro5' Galloway, CongressionalInvestigations: ProposedReforms, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.

478, 483 (1951). The article also suggests several other alternatives: 1) delegation of certain types of inquiries to various outside agencies; 2) a ban on
the creation of special investigating committees of Congress; or 3) voluntary
adoption of codes of fair conduct by congressional committees. Supra at 483.
See also, Chase, Improving Congressional Investigations: A No-Progress
Report, 30 TEMP. L. Q. 126 (1957).
52 Finer, Congressional Investigations: The British System, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.
521, 554 (1951). This article has a complete analysis of the British system of
investigation. For a comparison of the Australian system of investigation see,
Campbell, Parliamentary Investigations: The Australian Experience, 9 J.
Pu. L. 382 (1960).
' For detailed discussion of lease-option agreements see: Schneider, Tax Considerations in Planning Leases, 1960 TULANE TAX INST. 455; Kirby, Con-

siderations in Business Lease Arrangements, 34 TAXES 34 (1956) ; Griesinger,
Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, 33 HARV. Bus. REv. 75 (1955).
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gram of the lessor. The tax consequences are decidedly advantageous to the lessee. The rental deduction2 may exceed an allowable
depreciation rate; whereby the lessee, in effect, acquires a faster
return of capital.3 Also, a lease of unimproved land with an option
to purchase may provide a return of capital where depreciation is
not available.4 One tax advantage to the lessor may be capital gains
treatment on the subsequent sale of the leased equipment.5 Whatever the reasons are for a taxpayer to enter into a lease-option
agreement, he can be assured that the Commissioner will look with
a discerning eye upon the transaction. In the past when such agreements have come to the attention of the field examiners, the lessor
and lessee have been told that the contracts were actually conditional sales. A prospective lessee should be hesitant to enter into
leasing plans where the tax advantages appear too attractive be6
cause the probability of future tax difficulties is great.
From the time of its inception in the Revenue Act of 1916, the
rental deduction provision 7 has caused frequent litigation in regard to lease-option agreements. Prior to 1950 the case law appeared to be conflicting. When the Tax Court in a 1950 decision,
Chicago Stoker Corporation v. Commissioner s laid down a definite
economic or mechanical test to be followed, the law appeared to
be clarified. However two years later in Benton v. C. I. R. the
Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court stating:
The economic relation of the value of the property to the
option price was only one factor to be considered in determining intent. Further, that factor must be considered not
as of the time for the exercise of the option, but rather in
2 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §162(a) (3) which provides for a deduction from
gross income for "rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title
or in which he has no equity."
3 See Benton v. C.I.R., 197 F2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
4 See Robert A. Taft v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 808 (1933). The taxpayer
unsuccessfully attempted to secure a return of his expenditures for land
by rental deduction and then exercise the option to purchase for a fraction
of its original price. If the plan had been upheld, the land would have been
acquired at a basis far below its fair market value and taxpayer would have
deducted part of the "cost" as a rental which otherwise would not be allowed
as a depreciation deduction if he had purchased it outright.
5 See Eaton v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 869 (1948). But see, also, Truman
Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446 (1949) where the court finds the lease
agreement to be a conditional sales contract.
6 See Griesinger, Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, supra note 1.
7 Supra note 2.
8 14 T.C. 441 (1950). Here the court held, "If payments are large enough to
exceed the depreciation and value of the property, it is less of a distortion
of income to regard the payments as purchase price and allow depreciation
on the property than to offset the entire payment against the income of one
year." The intent of the parties and the formalities of the contract were
considered immaterial.
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the light of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the
time the parties entered into the contract.9
Due to the obvious difficulty that confronted taxpayers, tax
practitioners, and courts with respect to lease-option agreements,
the Revenue Service in 1955 issued a set of rulings designed to aid
in the determination of the tax treatment of several variations of
such agreements.1 0 These rulings accept the reinstatement of the
intent of the parties test as set forth in the Benton case, but they
do not provide any conclusive criteria for the determination of "intent." The Revenue Service in an illustration points out that one
factor indicating a lease arrangement to be a conditional sale is
where the amount of the rentals approximates "82% of the total
value of the equipment for a period of use of only 75% of the useful life of the equipment."' 1 As a tentative answer to this adverse
factor, it is possible for a taxpayer, under the accelerated depreciation methods of the 1954 Code, during the first 75% of the life
of the equipment to write off over 81% of the cost under the declining-balance method and 93% under the sum-of-the-digits
method. Therefore, it appears doubtful that rentals "which do not
exceed the authorized depreciation rates should be used as 'compelling' evidence of a sale rather than a lease."' 2
Upon an analysis of the facts in the principal case it appears
that an adherence to the rulings could have resulted in a sale rather
than a lease. 13 If a lessee chose plan A, it would be paying 75%
of the list price in three years on equipment that could be purchased
for 45% of the list price at the end of that time. Hence, almost twothirds (65.2%) is required to be paid in a period which is definitely
less than one-half of the minimum useful life of seven years indicating that the rentals are excessive and the lessee is acquiring an
equity. By applying the same test to plans B and C the result is even
more indicative of a sale. In plan C the lessee is paying 35% rental
in one year on equipment that could be purchased for 80% at the
expiration of that time. Here over 30% (30.4%) of the total sum to
9 Supra note 3, at 752. The holding in the Benton case was followed by the

Seventh Circuit. Breece Veneer and Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d
319 (7th Cir. 1956).
10 Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cum. Bul. 39: "Whether an agreement, which in form
is a lease, is in substance a conditional sales contract depends upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by the provisions of the agreement read in
light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was
executed."; See also Rev. Rul. 541, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 19 and Rev. Rul. 542,
1955-2 Cum. Bul. 59.
1 Rev. Rul. 542, supra note 10, at 60.
12 Kirby, Considerationsin Business Lease Arrangements, supra note 1, at 44.
'3 Rev. Rul. 540, supra note 10, at 41 indicates that a sale is intended if the
"total amount which lessee is required to pay for a relatively short period
of use constitutes an inordinately large proportion of the total sum required
to be paid to secure the transfer of title." Also see supra note 11.
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be paid will be charged off in one year when the equipment carries
a minimum useful life of seven. However, the court pointed out:
The mere fact that rentals are high does not indicate that
a portion thereof is in reality a payment on an installment
sale, particularly when there is no evidence to show that such
rentals, though high, are unreasonable, and there is positive
credible evidence that they are fair. 14
The plaintiff explained that the rentals were determined by utilizing the service of its own employees, dealers, and dealers' employees. From these individuals a price was arrived at that would
compensate plaintiff for its average cost to rebuild, insure, store and
resell machines returned to it, plus depreciation and possible obsolesence. Defendant called no witness to testify that the rentals exceeded a fair market value'15 Defendant argued that the rentals were
not related to use. This was answered when plaintiff produced testimony which explained that there was no practical way to measure
use. This testimony was uncontradicted by the defendant. The defendant then argued that the option prices were unreasonable.1
Plaintiff explained that the option prices were also formulated by
a composite judgment of its employees, dealers, and dealers' employees who took into account the fact that the used tool market
would fluctuate over a seven year period. These prices were to represent a probable market value. Evidence showed that beginning
in 1955 through 1958, sixty-four lessees exercised their options
granted to them under their respective plans. Of these, 44% chose
to terminate and 56% exercised the option to purchase. The fact
that the percentages were so close indicated the reasonableness of
the option price to the market value. Defendant limited its case on
the unreasonableness of the option prices to what it could elicit on
cross-examination.
The principal case is an example of two points likely to be
checked by the Revenue Service when it discovers these agreements: excessive rentals and the option prices.' 7 As the case points
' 4 Kearney & Trecker Corporation v. Commissioner, 195 F.Supp. 158, 163 (E.D.
Wis. 1961).
'15 Two recent cases where the Commissioner failed to produce evidence to prove
the rental payments to be excessive are: Fishing Tackle Products Company v
Commissioner, 27 T.C. 638 (1957) and WBSR Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
747 (1958).
16 Rev. Rul. 540, supra note 10, at 42 indicates that a sale is intended if, "The
property may be acquired under a purchase option at a price which is nominal in relation to the value of the property at the time when the option may
be exercised as determined at the time of entering into the original agreement, or which is a relatively small amount when compared with the total payments which are required to be made."
17 Other pitfalls to avoid are when the lease-option agreement provides for
an automatic passage of title when the rentals equal the original list price
plus any added expenses such as freight or financing charges. And, if the
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out, the fact that the plaintiff had credible evidence showing how it
arrived at both the rentals and the option prices indicated that the
parties intended to enter into lease-option agreements and not conditional sales. The case leaves open the question as to whether
rental payments must be related to use where the latter can be deJerry L. Haushalter
termined.
Zoning: Restriction of Church Construction in Residential Districts-A Village of Bayside, Milwaukee County, ordinance of 1954
failed to provide any district wherein a church could be constructed.
The Lake Drive Baptist Church obtained its property, partly by gift
and partly by option, from a parishioner, in 1955, after it had been
given an encouraging reception from the Bayside village board concerning the building of a church on the property. A plat plan and plans
for construction and off street parking were submitted to the board
upon request.
In 1956 the board engaged a consultant to aid in determining areas
suitable for institutional purposes. After this the zoning ordinance was
amended to provide for several class "E" districts in which land could
be used for institutional purposes including churches. However, relator's property was not included in a class "E" district, despite the recommendation of the planning commission. In 1957 the church presented
plans and specifications drawn by its architects along with its application for a building permit. The planning commission recommended
rezoning the property into a class "E" district. The village board denied
the request, apparently basing its action on 1). a petition signed by
three hundred residents of the village which requested that the board
preserve the residential character of the area; 2). the traffic problems
involved; 3). the decrease in property values in the area resulting from
the construction of a church.
Relator sought a writ of mandamus to force the issuance of a building permit on the grounds that the action of the village board was
arbitrary and capricious. The trial court held that the board was within
its authority under the zoning provisions as found in the Constitution
of the United States, and that the equities were in favor of the board.
The trial court apparently relied upon the factors considered by the
village board in reaching its decision and considered that these outweighed any claim that could be made by the church. The Supreme
Court held, that the action of the board was arbitrary and capricious.
It remanded the cause with directions to enjoin enforcement of the
zoning ordinance against construction of the church on relator's site,
rentals do not equal the above, the lessee can apply the rentals to the purchase price. Truman Bowen v. Commissioner, supra note 5.

